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From Antislavery Lawyer  
to Chief Justice:  
The Remarkable but Forgotten 
Career of Salmon P. Chase 
Randy E. Barnett † 
Abstract 
The name Salmon P. Chase is barely known and his career is largely 
forgotten. In this Article, I seek to revive his memory by tracing the arc 
of his career from antislavery lawyer, to antislavery politician, to Chief 
Justice of the United States. In addition to explaining why his is a 
career worth both remembering and honoring, I offer some possible 
reasons why his remarkable achievements have largely been forgotten. 
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Introduction: Constitutional Abolitionism 
For several years, I have been studying a long-forgotten band of 
constitutionalists who, in the 1830s, ’40s, and ’50s, denied that the 
U.S. Constitution was proslavery.1 They advocated enforcing the text 
of the Constitution without any gloss put upon it by intentions, 
understandings, or deals that were not expressly included therein. 
They contended that Congress not only had the power to ban the 
international slave trade, it also had the power to ban the interstate 
slave trade and to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, in the 
territories under its jurisdiction, and in any states formed from these 
territories. They also contended that the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 
and 1850 were unconstitutional. These positions put them at odds 
with the Garrisonian abolitionists who claimed that the Constitution 
was “a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell”2 because it 
sanctioned slavery. 
When I finally began writing this Article, I wanted to include 
biographical information about each member of this forgotten group. 
Gradually, I came to realize that most of them had something in 
common. Unlike the Garrisonians, many of whom became anarchists, 
these antislavery constitutionalists favored political action. Most were 
involved in organizing the expressly antislavery Liberty Party as an 
alternative to the proslavery Democrats and the compromising, 
equivocating Whigs.  
To learn more about the Liberty Party, I turned to historian 
Richard Sewell’s Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the 
United States 1837–1860.3 In his book, Sewell describes what he calls 
“political abolitionism” that, unlike the Garrisonians, favored political 
action to attack what was then called the Slave Power.4 Sewell relates 
 
1. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The 
Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. Legal Analysis 
165 (2011) (highlighting the contributions and tactics of key abolitionist 
constitutionalists). 
2. Resolution Adopted at the Annual Meeting of the Massachusetts Anti 
Slavery Society, in Faneuil Hall, January 26, 1843, in The Liberator, 
Apr. 21, 1843, at 63. (“Resolved, That the Compact which exists between the 
North and the South is a ‘covenant with death, and an agreement with hell,’ 
—involving both parties in atrocious criminality,—and should be 
immediately annulled.”). 
3. Richard H. Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in 
the United States 1837–1860 (1976).  
4. See id. at ix (describing “political abolitionists” as those “who, though never 
attached to an antislavery society or insistent on immediate emancipation, 
nonetheless embraced non-extension in part because they thought it a 
perfectly constitutional way to hasten slavery’s downfall”). Indeed, Sewell 
did not invent the term “political abolitionist.” In June of 1855, a 
convention of “Radical Political Abolitionists” was called by Lewis Tappan, 
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a very clear chronology: the Liberty Party, founded in the 1840s by 
these political abolitionists, soon led to the Free Soil Party, which led 
briefly to the Free Democrat Party, and finally in the mid-1850s to 
the founding of the Republican Party. 
Like many other historians of the period, Sewell gave very short 
shrift to the constitutional theorizing of these political abolitionists. 
What my study showed, however, is that this very same group of 
political activists advanced a powerful constitutional case against 
slavery—a case that was based on the protection of natural rights, the 
original meaning of the text of the Constitution, the limits on the 
enumerated powers of Congress, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. What is more, their constitutional arguments are 
remarkably persuasive compared to those advanced by the Supreme 
Court in cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford.5  
The constitutional approach of this group deserves its own label: 
constitutional abolitionist, a term actually used by some at the time 
or shortly thereafter to describe this movement.6 Like the radical 
abolitionists, constitutional abolitionists desired the complete abolition of 
slavery. But unlike some radical abolitionists, like Garrison and his 
legal compatriot Wendell Philips, who believed that the Constitution 
was a covenant with death and an agreement with hell and who 
favored disunion,7 the constitutional abolitionists believed that the 
Constitution was fundamentally antislavery. 
 
W.E. Whiting, William Goodell, James McCune Smith, Gerrit Smith, 
George Whipple, S.S. Jocelyn, and Frederick Douglass and held in Syracuse, 
New York. See Proceedings of the Convention of Radical 
Political Abolitionists 3–4 (1855). 
5. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
6. See Benjamin F. Shaw, Owen Lovejoy, Constitutional Abolitionists and 
the Republican Party, in 111 Transactions of the McClean Cnty. 
Historical Soc’y 60, 62 (Ezra M. Prince ed., 1900) (“[T]he fight for 
liberty in this land was begun by the Radical Abolitionist long before the 
final battle. . . . They were, however, followed by a class known as the 
Constitutional Abolitionists; equally bold and brave, but more practical. It 
was the labor of the latter that accomplished glorious results; fought the 
good battle to a finish and destroyed the slave power. They were among the 
organizers of the Republican Party.”); Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team 
of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln 676 (2005) 
(quoting Lincoln’s Attorney General James Speed as saying “I am a 
thorough Constitutional Abolitionist”). 
7. See generally Lewis Perry, Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and 
the Government of God in Antislavery Thought (1973) (reviewing 
radical antislavery movements and their respective weaknesses in 
execution); William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery 
Constitutionalism in America, 1760–1848 (1977) (tracking shifts in 
Constitutional attitudes and movements regarding slavery). 
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Yet, the constitutional abolitionists were divided among themselves 
on one key issue. Some like Lysander Spooner, William Goodell, Joel 
Tiffany, and Gerrit Smith contended that slavery was unconstitutional 
anywhere in the United States. Others believed that, while slavery 
should be abolished everywhere, as a matter of positive law, slavery 
was constitutional within those of the original thirteen states that 
retained the practice.  
The leading figure in this second camp was Salmon P. Chase. Of all 
the figures I surveyed, none was more important than he. Indeed, in a 
previous article I considerably underestimated his influence.8 In this 
Article, I seek to rectify that error. My goal is to help revive the memory 
of Salmon P. Chase to its rightful place in our constitutional history. 
Whether they know it or not, all those reading this Article have 
heard Chase’s name, many have used it, and most see it every day. 
Yes, that’s right. Chase Bank, originally founded in 1877, some four 
years after his death, was named in his honor.9 As one drives down 
the street in most cities, one sees Chase’s name prominently 
displayed, even illuminated in the darkness. But, though some readers 
have also heard the name Salmon P. Chase, if these readers are like 
me, they may not remember exactly who he was and what he did to 
earn this posthumous honor. 
Perhaps they know that he was Chief Justice of the United 
States. Perhaps they even know he was a politically ambitious rival of 
Lincoln who also wanted to be president. But what he stood for 
throughout his accomplished career has largely been forgotten. Long 
before he was Chief Justice of the United States, Salmon P. Chase 
was among the most prominent, brilliant, and ultimately politically 
effective members of this group of constitutional abolitionists. By 
forgetting them, we have also forgotten him. 
I. Chase’s Rise to the Chief Justiceship 
A. Chase’s Early Years 
Salmon Portland Chase was born in New Hampshire in 1808, the 
year Congress abolished the slave trade.10 He was nine when his father  
8. Because I neglected Chase’s argument in the Matilda case, he entered 
my chronology in mid-1840s, rather than the 1830s. See Barnett, supra 
note 1, at 210. As a result, my account failed to notice the degree to 
which he influenced the constitutional analysis of others I discuss in the 
late 1830s and early 1840s. In short, Chase was far more influential than 
I gave him credit for being. 
9.  J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., The History of JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. 4 (2008). 
10. Unless otherwise noted, the facts in the next several paragraphs are 
taken from the excellent biography, John Niven, Salmon P. Chase: A 
Biography (1995). This is the biography of Chase that is sold in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s gift shop. 
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died, and, by the time he was twelve, his mother found herself unable to 
support him and his siblings. She prevailed upon her brother-in-law and 
Chase’s uncle, Philander Chase, to take him into his care. Philander had 
just become the Protestant Episcopal bishop of Ohio and was running a 
boy’s school in Worthington, Ohio, just north of Columbus. 
The trip to the Western Reserve was an adventure for the young 
boy. His twenty-three-year-old brother and a neighbor, who were both 
joining an expedition to Michigan and Wisconsin, would take him by 
steamship as far as Cleveland. In 1820, Cleveland “was not much to 
see: a hamlet with a population of about 500 people, dwellings 
straggled across the heavily wooded bluffs that rose abruptly from the 
lake.”11 As there was no harbor, small boats conveyed the party to the 
mouth of the Cuyahoga River. 
In Cleveland, Chase boarded with a local judge named Barber until 
someone could be found to take the boy to Worthington. Eventually, 
an Episcopal minister took him as far as Medina, where two other 
clergymen got him to his uncle’s place. Chase lived with his uncle there 
for two years until, no longer able to sustain the school, Philander 
accepted the presidency of Cincinnati College, which brought Salmon 
to the city where his legal and political career would begin. 
But first Chase went back east for college at Dartmouth very near 
his boyhood home. After graduating in 1826, he moved to Washing-
ton, D.C. He first tried his hand as a school teacher, before deciding 
to study law with Attorney General William Wirt. Studying in 
Washington gave Chase the opportunity to watch cases argued before 
the Supreme Court. His association with Wirt and Wirt’s family 
enabled him to meet many of the most prominent political and legal 
figures of his day. 
When, after two years of study, Chase applied for the bar, his 
examination by the judges went well until he was asked about the 
length of his legal training. When he admitted it was not the required 
three years, the presiding judge instructed him he would need to 
study another year. Chase pleaded with the court. “Please your 
honors, . . . I have made arrangements to go to the Western country 
and practice law” there.12 After a brief conference, the judges decided 
to swear him in as a member of the bar.  
By a strange coincidence, Lysander Spooner, perhaps the leading 
figure of abolitionist constitutionalism, also achieved bar membership 
prematurely after two years of study. At the time, Massachusetts 
required three years of apprenticeship for college graduates, while 
those who, like Spooner, had not gone to college had to study for 
five. Spooner defied the rule by opening his own practice in 
Worchester after apprenticing for just two years with two prominent 
 
11. Id. at 11. 
12. Id. at 27.  
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Massachusetts political and legal figures: John Davis and Charles 
Allen. A few months later, he published a lengthy petition to the 
Massachusetts legislature in the Worchester Republican, in which he 
urged it to end the restriction on bar admission. Among his many 
arguments, Spooner maintained that  
the Courts were made for and by the people, and not the people 
for or by the Courts. Suitors, when in Court, are the people, 
and it is their right to present their causes to their own Courts, 
by whatever counsel they may think it for their interest to 
present them . . . .13  
During its 1836 session, the legislature agreed, and Spooner was 
allowed to become a member of the bar.14 
Chase’s law license secured, in 1830, he returned to Ohio, where 
he practiced law in Cincinnati. In those days, Cincinnati was a 
political cauldron. Its proximity to the slave state of Kentucky 
enmeshed it in the slavery economy, and much of its citizenry was 
sympathetic. But Cincinnati’s location also made it a nearby refuge 
for antislavery Southerners who no longer felt welcome in their home 
states. One such refugee was James G. Birney, a former Kentucky 
slave owner—and Princeton educated lawyer—who turned against 
slavery and left his state for Cincinnati. There, Birney founded an 
abolitionist newspaper called the Philanthropist. 
In 1836, Chase was drawn into antislavery activities when a mob 
attacked Birney’s paper, destroying his press. At the time, Chase had 
yet to take any public stance on the slavery question. But when he 
heard that the mob was heading to the Franklin House to tar and 
feather Birney, Chase raced to the hotel to warn the publisher.  
As the mob surged forward, Chase braced his arms against the 
door frame, blocking the hotel’s entrance with his body. Six feet 
two, with broad shoulders, a massive chest, and a determined set 
to his jaw, Chase gave the rioters pause. The crowd demanded to 
know who he was. “Salmon P. Chase,” the young lawyer replied. 
 
13. Lysander Spooner, To the Members of the Legislature of Massachusetts, 
Worchester Republican—Extra 4 (Aug. 26, 1835), reprinted in 2 
The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner (1971). See also id. 
at 1 (“Any man, who is allowed the management of his own affairs, has 
the right to decide for himself whom he will employ as counsel. . . .”). 
14. Charles Shively, Biography, in 1 The Collected Works of 
Lysander Spooner 17–18 (1971). Like Chase, Spooner had an Ohio 
connection. Having gone West to seek his fortune, Spooner purchased 
the land that now constitutes Grand Rapids, Ohio, as a speculative 
venture. Id. at 20–21. When the speculation failed, Spooner returned to 
his family’s home in Athol, Massachusetts, to turn his attention to the 
issue of slavery. Id. at 24. 
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“You will pay for your actions,” a frustrated member of the mob 
told him. “I [can] be found at any time,” Chase said.15 
In fact, it was members of the mob who were made to pay 
damages when Birney retained Chase to bring a successful tort action 
against them for the property damage they had caused. 
B. Chase as an Antislavery Lawyer 
In 1837, Birney also enlisted the twenty-nine-year-old Chase to 
represent a young runaway slave named Matilda, who had been seized 
by slave catchers. Matilda was the light-skinned daughter of her 
owner, who had brought her with him on a long trip through free 
territory passing as his white daughter. Having tasted freedom, she 
pleaded with her father for a certificate of emancipation, but he 
refused. She then fled to the small neighborhood of free blacks in 
Cincinnati where she found refuge before coming into Birney’s employ 
as a maid.16 
Chase brought a writ of habeas corpus for her freedom and argued 
the case before the local judge. Based in part on ideas developed by 
Birney in the Philanthropist, Chase’s hastily prepared argument was 
multifaceted.17 The Fugitive Slave Act of 179318 authorized a slave 
owner to seize a fugitive slave in a free state and return her to 
bondage after obtaining a certificate of removal from a federal judge 
or a state magistrate in the free state. One of Chase’s principal claims 
was that the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional because it was 
beyond the delegated powers of Congress to enact.  
Article IV says that  
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the 
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of 
any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service 
or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to 
whom such Service or Labour may be due.19 
Chase asked, 
 
15. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 109. 
16. The events surrounding the Matilda case and Chase’s involvement are 
discussed in Niven, supra note 10, at 50–54. See also Frederick J. Blue, 
From Right to Left: The Political Conversion of Salmon P. Chase, 21 
N. Ky. L. Rev. 1, 9–12 (1993). 
17. Salmon P. Chase, Speech of Salmon P. Chase in the Case of 
the Colored Woman, Matilda, Who was Brought Before the 
Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio, by Writ 
of Habeas Corpus (Mar. 11, 1837) [hereinafter Matilda Speech]. 
18  Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302, repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 166, 13 Stat. 200. 
19. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013  
The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase 
660 
Does this clause confer any power on government, or on any 
officer or department of government?—Clearly not. It says 
nothing about the government, or its officers, or its 
departments. It declares that the citizens of no state in the 
Union, legally entitled to the service of any person, shall be 
deprived of that right to service, by the operation of the laws of 
any state into which the servant may escape; and it requires 
such state to deliver him up, on the claim of the lawful master.20 
But it gives no power of enforcement to Congress. 
According to Chase, the provisions of the first three articles of the 
Constitution create, define, and empower the national government, 
with Congress’s powers defined primarily in Article I. In contrast, 
Article IV constitutes a compact among the states themselves. “[T]he 
creation of a government and the establishment of a compact, are 
entirely distinct in their nature.”21 Most importantly, “clauses of 
compact confer no powers on the [national] government: and the 
powers of [that] government cannot be exerted, except in virtue of 
express provisions, to enforce the matters of compact.”22 
Article IV, Chase contended, provides articles of compact among 
the several states, amounting to treaty obligations to be enforced like 
other treaties by the parties themselves, not by the federal 
government. 
The clause has nothing to do with the creation of a form of 
government. It is, in the strictest sense, a clause of compact. 
The parties to the agreement are the states. The general 
government is not a party to it, nor affected by it. If the clause 
stood alone in the constitution, it would mean precisely what it 
does now, and would be just as obligatory as it is now. Nothing 
can be plainer, then, than that this clause cannot be construed 
as vesting any power in the government, or in any of its 
departments, or in any of its officers; and this is the only 
provision in the constitution which at all relates to fugitives 
from labor.23 
To further support his “compact” interpretation of Article IV, Chase 
contrasted the Fugitive Slave Clause with Article IV’s Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.24 After imposing a duty on each state to give “Full Faith 
and Credit . . . to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State,” Article IV there, and only there, gives Congress a 
 
20. Matilda Speech, supra note 17, at 20. 
21. Id. at 19. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 20–21 (footnote omitted). 
24  Id. at 21–22. 
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power to “by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, 
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”25 
Chase then posed the following challenge to the court: “Am I not right 
in saying that the framers of the constitution were aware, that without 
this special provision, congress would have no power to legislate upon 
the subject of the section?”26 If the first clause, by its own force, 
“confers on Congress legislative power,” he asked, “why add the 
second? Why add it, if legislative power is conferred by the general 
grant, or by any other provision in the constitution?”27 
Nor could the Necessary and Proper Clause be used to support the 
Fugitive Slave Act. “[T]he general grant of legislative power is expressly 
confined to the enactment of laws, necessary and proper to carry into 
execution” only those enumerated powers that are vested in Congress.28  
The constitution restrains the operation of the state constitutions 
and the state laws, which would enfranchise the fugitive. It also 
binds the states to deliver him up on the claim of the master, and 
by necessary inference, it obliges them to provide a tribunal before 
which such claim may be asserted and tried, and by which such 
claims may be decided upon, and, if valid, enforced: but it confers 
no jot of legislative power on congress.29  
Chase quoted the Tenth Amendment as authority for his claim that 
the power to enforce the duty to return runaway slaves is reserved to 
the states.30 
Chase proceeded to connect his textual argument to the founders. 
The framers of the constitution were men of large experience, 
comprehensive knowledge, sound judgment, and great ability. 
Among them were Hamilton, and Madison, and Washington. 
Such men, in framing such an instrument would avoid all 
needless repetition. They would not incorporate into the 
constitution a special provision upon any subject unnecessarily. 
To them, therefore, the second clause of the section under 
consideration, must have appeared not only fit, but necessary. 
But if a special provision was necessary to enable congress to 
legislate in regard to the authentication and effect of records, 
 
25. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
26. Matilda Speech, supra note 17, at 22. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 21. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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why is not a special provision necessary to enable congress to 
legislate in regard to fugitive servants?31 
Chase’s argument failed to convince the local judge who 
remanded Matilda to the slave catchers. She was swiftly taken “down 
the river” to be sold at auction in New Orleans, her fate then lost to 
history.32 Birney was then prosecuted and convicted on the charge of 
harboring a fugitive slave in violation of Ohio’s black code.33 The 
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed his conviction on the narrow ground 
that Birney lacked knowledge of Matilda’s legal status, rather than 
the constitutional grounds asserted by Chase in his appeal of Birney’s 
conviction.34 
Chase’s argument in the Matilda case was published as a 
pamphlet and distributed widely throughout the country where it 
elevated his visibility and provided the legal basis for other challenges 
to the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act. In Wisconsin, for 
example, it constituted the main line of Byron Paine’s successful 
defense of editor Sherman Booth, who had been charged under the 
Fugitive Slave Act of assisting in the escape of a captured slave.35 
Payne’s challenge was successful,36 that is, until the ruling was 
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Abelman v. Booth in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Taney.37 
Chase’s legal defense of Matilda and other fugitives earned him 
the nickname the “attorney general for runaway negroes” from his 
critics in Kentucky.38 “Chase soon was using the title with pride, 
 
31. Id. at 22. Chase made his argument in Matilda well before Spooner 
shifted the interpretive methodology of constitutional abolitionism from 
focusing on framers’ intent to the legal or objective meaning of the text. 
See Barnett, supra note 1, at 199–205 (describing Spooner’s interpretive 
approach). When, after Spooner’s book was published, Chase made his 
argument in Van Zandt the next year, his methodology had changed. 
See infra text accompanying notes 40–61. 
32. Blue, supra note 16, at 11.  
33. Id.  
34. Id.; see also Harold M. Hyman, The Reconstruction Justice of 
Salmon P. Chase 45 (Peter Charles Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 1997). 
35. Byron Paine, Unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Act: 
Argument of Byron Paine, Esq., and Opinion of Hon. A. D. 
Smith 5–6, 18 (1854); see also Barnett, supra note 1, at 240–43 
(discussing Payne’s defense of Booth). 
36. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 18 (1854) (opinion of Smith, J.); id. at 67 
(opinion of the court). 
37. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859). 
38. Blue, supra note 16, at 12. 
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although it was not meant as a compliment, for ‘I never refused my 
help to any person black or white.’ ”39  
His enumerated powers argument, like so many of the 
abolitionist constitutional claims, seems powerful and almost 
obvious when first encountered. Yet these arguments, and the men 
who developed them, are largely unknown today. They are rarely 
mentioned in law schools, even when the topic of slavery and the 
Constitution arises. In Part III of this Article, I will consider possible 
explanations for this widespread neglect. 
Years later, in 1846, Chase would present a more developed 
version of this argument to the United States Supreme Court in the 
case of Jones v. Van Zandt.40 In his Van Zandt brief, Chase renewed 
his structural objection to the Fugitive Slave Act as outside the 
enumerated powers of Congress. “[N]o power to legislate on the subject 
is conferred, unless by very remote implication, upon Congress, by the 
constitution.”41 To this he added a Due Process Clause objection of 
the sort that had become popular among constitutional abolitionists 
beginning with the writings of Theodore Dwight Weld in 1838.42 
“Now, unless it can be shewn that no process of law at all, is the 
same thing as due process of law,” Chase contended, “it must be 
admitted that the act which authorizes seizures without process, is 
repugnant to a constitution which expressly forbids it.”43 Slaves were 
entitled to the protection of the Clause, he argued, because they were 
persons. “It is vain to say that the fugitive is not a person: for the 
claim to him can be maintained only on the ground that he is a 
person.”44 Chase was here referring to the wording of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause, which begins, “[n]o Person held to Service or Labor in 
 
39. Id. (referencing Chase’s language a letter he sent to John T. Trowbridge 
in 1864).  
40. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). The lawyer filing the 
formal appearance in the case was William Seward, who would serve 
with Chase in Lincoln’s cabinet as the Secretary of State. 
41. S.P. Chase, An Argument for the Defendant, Submitted to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, at the December 
Term, 1846, In the Case of Wharton Jones v. Vanzandt 72 
(1847). In this pamphlet the defendant’s name is spelled “Vanzandt,” 
unlike in the United States Reports where it is spelled “Van Zandt.” 
42. Compare id. at 88–89 (“I submit, further, that the act is 
unconstitutional . . . [because i]t authorizes seizure and confinement, by 
private force, without legal process.”), with Theodore Dwight Weld, 
The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia 37–41 
(4th ed. 1838). See generally Barnett, supra note 1, at 176–83 
(discussing Weld’s argument and situating it against Due Process 
Clause arguments on behalf of slave owners). 
43. Chase, supra note 41, at 89. 
44. Id. 
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one State . . . .”45 To show that fugitive slaves were considered 
persons under the Due Process Clause, Chase noted that, while the 
Virginia ratification convention had proposed a clause reading, “no 
free man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, but by the law 
of the land,” Congress changed its scope to “[n]o person.”46 
Chase’s Due Process Clause challenge rested on the “summary 
manner” by which slaves were to be recaptured under the Act.47 
Suppose an owner of a horse should find the animal in the possession 
of his neighbor and, “instead of resorting to due process of law, and 
the old fashioned replevin,” were to simply seize the animal and “take 
him before his own hired magistrate, and prove his claim by 
affidavits.”48 Or if he claims a failure to provide services, “instead of 
suing him for breach of contract, let him drag his reluctant neighbor 
before his magistrate, establish his claim, and then remove him to his 
task.”49 Chase then asked, “How long would society hold together, if 
this principle were carried into general application?”50 
Near the end of his brief, which in pamphlet form runs 107 pages, 
citing Calder v. Bull,51 Chase identified “certain great principles of 
natural right and justice,” which were intended “to establish as 
written law” in the Constitution, but “which exist independently of 
all such sanction.”52 These great principles are: 
No Legislature is omnipotent. No Legislature can make right 
wrong; or wrong, right No Legislature can make light, darkness; 
or darkness, light. No Legislature can make men, things; or 
things, men. Nor is any Legislature at liberty to disregard the 
fundamental principles of rectitude or justice. Whether 
restrained or not by constitutional provision, there are acts 
beyond any legitimate or binding legislative authority.53 
Such acts beyond legislative authority include: 
The Legislature cannot authorize injustice by law; cannot nullify 
private contracts; cannot abrogate the seeurities [sic] of life, 
liberty and property, which, it is the very object of society, as 
 
45. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
46. Chase, supra note 41, at 89. 
47.  Id. at 96. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
52. Chase, supra note 41, at 93. 
53. Id. 
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well as of our constitution of government, to provide; cannot 
make a man a judge in his own case; cannot repeal the laws of 
nature; cannot create any obligation to do wrong, or neglect 
duty. No court is bound to enforce unjust law; but, on the 
contrary, every court is bound, by prior and superior 
obligations, to abstain from enforcing such law.54 
Chase then allowed that it “must be a clear case, doubtless, which 
will warrant a court in pronouncing a law so unjust that it ought not 
to be enforced; but, in a clear case, the path of duty is plain.”55 
Chase also made some methodological claims about constitutional 
interpretation. He countered a proslavery construction of the Consti-
tution based on “the intention of [the] framers” by appealing to what 
he called the “plain import” of the text.56 In today’s parlance, he 
rejected framers’ intent originalism in favor of public-meaning 
originalism. It is likely no coincidence that just the year before, 
Lysander Spooner made the case against reliance on framers’ intent in 
his widely read book, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery.57 Also like 
Spooner, Chase contended that natural rights should govern the 
construction of positive laws.58 If there is a conceivable construction 
 
54. Id. at 93–94. 
55. Id. at 94. 
56. Id. at 105. 
57. See Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery 
(1845). Spooner developed his interpretive approach in response to 
abolitionist Wendell Phillips’s use of James Madison’s recently disclosed 
notes of the Philadelphia convention in his book, Wendell Phillips, 
The Constitution: A Pro-Slavery Compact; or, Extracts from 
the Madison Papers, etc. (1844). See Barnett, supra note 1, at 203–
05 (discussing how Spooner formulated his constitutional argument and 
the link between the arguments of Spooner and Phillips). Spooner was 
hopeful of Chase. “I have been in the habit of considering him the most 
important anti-slavery man in the west, and therefore I am anxious he 
should be on the right ground.” Lysander Spooner, Letter to George 
Bradburn (December 7, 1846). But the cantankerous Spooner was also 
disappointed in Chase’s failure to embrace some of Spooner’s 
substantive arguments. “As to Chase, if I had him within arm’s length, I 
would break every bone in his body, if I could not otherwise make him 
understand, and either yield to, or answer the arguments in my book.” 
Id. A year later, Spooner assumed that a respectful but unsigned review 
of his book in the Cincinnati Herald was by Chase. See Lysander 
Spooner, Letter to George Bradburn (December 5, 1847) (“Did you see 
the Cincinnati Herald’s review of my book? It was respectful towards 
me, and complimentary of the ability of the book. It was such a farrago 
of absurd crotchets! It appeared as editorial—but I conjecture it was 
from Chase.”). 
58. Spooner’s emphatic use of this language from Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in United States v. Fisher was picked up and emulated by other 
constitutional abolitionists: 
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that would harmonize positive and natural law, it should be adopted by 
the courts. Indeed, Chase adopts a “presumption in favor of liberty.”59 
In addition to this methodological claim, Chase employed a 
standard abolitionist technique of meeting claims about the 
supposed intentions of the framers with an opposite supposition. 
Given that the preexisting state constitutions had “guarantied the 
absolute, inherent and inalienable rights of all the inhabitants or 
citizens,” it could “hardly be supposed that any state, especially any 
non-slaveholding state, would have agreed to a constitution which 
would withdraw, from any of these rights, the ample shield of the 
fundamental law, and leave them exposed to the almost unlimited 
discretion of Congress.”60 As authority for this claim, Chase quoted 
the words of the Tenth Amendment.61 
Notice here another forgotten fact. Before the Civil War, it was 
the Slave Power who enlisted the power of the federal government to 
impose the Fugitive Slave Acts. And it was the Northern states who 
complained about the interference with their rights to protect their 
free blacks from being kidnaped by slave catchers and sold down the 
river. “States’ rights” was as much an antislavery doctrine as it was a 
proslavery doctrine. 
Chase’s argument in Van Zandt, however, came four years after 
the Court had rejected similar arguments in the case of Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania.62 In Prigg, Justice Story upheld the constitutionality of 
the Fugitive Slave Act by adopting an expansive interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
No one has ever supposed that Congress could, constitutionally, 
by its legislation, exercise powers, or enact laws beyond the 
powers delegated to it by the Constitution; but it has, on 
 
Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are 
overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed 
from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible 
clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to 
effect such objects. 
 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805). 
59. Chase, supra note 41, at 97 (“It is certainly incumbent, then, on those 
who claim, that, by the constitution, the general law and presumption 
in favor of liberty are set aside to give room for this right of recaption, 
to make out a clear case, and produce express words.”). 
60. Id. at 106. 
61. See id. (“Am I mistaken, then, in thinking that the whole argument 
establishes the proposition, that the power to legislate, in reference to 
escaping servants, is ‘a power not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, and is, therefore, 
reserved to the states respectively, or, to the people?’ ”). 
62. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013  
The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase 
667 
various occasions, exercised powers which were necessary and 
proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and 
duties expressly enjoined thereby. The end being required, it has 
been deemed a just and necessary implication, that the means 
to accomplish it are given also; or, in other words, that the 
power flows as a necessary means to accomplish the end.63 
Though widely condemned at the time by abolitionists, some 
constitutional abolitionists like Joel Tiffany would later assert that 
the precedent provided by Prigg empowered Congress to legislate 
against slavery.64 Later still, some Republicans in Congress would also 
claim Prigg as authority for its Reconstruction legislation. None of 
this later use of Prigg undermines the weakness of Story’s analysis of 
the enumerated powers. 
Chase’s argument in the Matilda case in the 1830s shows that 
Story’s capacious reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause was far 
from inevitable.65 Story’s analysis only seems compelling when the 
arguments on the other side are omitted. We are accustomed to 
hearing that a sweeping interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is needed to ensure, for example, the constitutionality of Civil 
Rights laws. Yet, Story’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
Prigg shows that a broad reading of congressional power can also be 
used to uphold evil.  
Because Chief Justice Taney had previously adopted a rule that 
denied oral argument on matters that had already been adjudicated 
by the Court, Chase’s challenge in the Van Zandt case was dismissed 
on the pleadings and he never appeared before the Court to present 
his argument in person.66 But his Van Zandt brief was also published 
as a pamphlet and received a wide circulation. The case “added 
 
63. Id. at 618–19. 
64. See Joel Tiffany, A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of 
American Slavery: Together with the Powers and Duties of 
the Federal Government In Relation to That Subject 99–100 
(1849). I discuss Tiffany’s views in Barnett, supra note 1, at 221–31. 
65.  See supra Part I.B. 
66.  See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Success Without Victory 61 (2003) (“Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney objected to hearing oral argument [in Van 
Zandt ], for he thought the constitutional question was already settled.”); 
see also Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229–30 (1847) 
(“This court has already, after much deliberation, decided that the act 
of February 12th, 1793, was not repugnant to the constitution. . . . We 
do not now propose to review at length the reasoning on which this act 
has been pronounced constitutional. . . . That this act of Congress, then, 
is not repugnant to the constitution, must be considered as among the 
settled adjudications of this court.” (citing Prigg, 41 U.S. 539)). 
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considerable luster to Chase’s national reputation,” as both a 
principled opponent of slavery and a defender of the Constitution.67 
C. Chase as an Antislavery Political Leader 
Unlike the Garrisonian abolitionists who eschewed political 
action,68 Chase engaged in electoral politics to pursue his antislavery 
agenda. In the 1840s, together with Birney and others, Chase helped 
form the Liberty Party, and became one of its leaders. Chase came to 
the Liberty Party after a less than successful initial association with 
the Whig Party.69  
Even as he was working to build the Liberty and then the Free 
Soil parties, Chase came to view himself as a Democrat. Like others, 
he sometimes called himself an “Independent Democrat” or a “Free 
Democrat,” a movement he hoped would one day capture the heart of 
that party.70 Part of his motivation was practical as “Cincinnati was 
solidly Democratic . . . .”71 But principle also played a major role. Chase 
was of the “belief, confirmed after years of intense study, that 
Jeffersonian idealism was basically much more appropriate to the 
abolitionist objective than the Whig program of economic development 
through national planning, which a strong central government would 
devise and execute.”72 “I do not concur in Whig views of public 
policy,” he wrote, “either as an antislavery man or as simply a 
citizen.”73 Chase “opposed a high tariff, a recharter of the now defunct 
Bank of the United States, (a Whig priority), or any system of 
government support for corporate banking.”74 Moreover, even Chase’s 
“views on slavery comported with Jeffersonian states’ rights doctrine. 
His arguments on fugitive slave cases consistently proclaimed slavery 
to be the creature of local custom and law.”75 
That Chase came from a Democratic background will explain 
much about his political sympathies: his strict constructionist views of 
the Constitution, his belief in laissez-faire, his opposition to economic 
 
67. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 113. 
68. See generally Perry, supra note 7. 
69. Chase was elected to the Cincinnati city council as a member of the 
Whig Party in 1840, but, despite Whig triumphs in most of the states, 
he lost reelection due to his refusal to support liquor licenses. See 
Niven, supra note 10, at 58–59. 
70. Id. at 146. 
71. Id. at 88.  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 96 (noting that Chase’s comments were made when he turned 
down an invitation to an antislavery conference in Columbus, Ohio). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 88. 
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(as opposed to revenue) tariffs, and his support of hard money over 
paper. It also explains the antipathy that later developed towards him 
by the Whigs who dominated Northern Ohio, and, later, by the 
former Whigs who joined the new Republican Party. Indeed, in the 
1850s, he initially opposed adopting the name “Republican” for the 
new antislavery party in favor of what he sometimes called himself, 
an independent or free Democrat. This background also helps to 
explain the tensions that arose between former-Democrat Chase and 
ex-Whig Abraham Lincoln.  
In 1845, Chase addressed the Southern and Western Convention of 
the newly formed Liberty Party on the question of the constitutionality 
of slavery. No less than one hundred thousand copies of Chase’s speech 
were printed and circulated in pamphlet form.76 In his speech, Chase 
declined to adopt the view expressed by other abolitionists “that no 
slaveholding, in any State of the Union, is compatible with a true and 
just construction of the Constitution,”77 but favored instead “its 
removal from each State by State authority.”78 On the other hand, like 
every constitutional abolitionist I have surveyed, Chase “would have it 
removed at once from all places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
National Government”—meaning the District of Columbia and the 
territories—pursuant to the “true sense and spirit” of the “Constitution 
rightly construed and administered.”79  
In sum, Chase contended that Congress had the power to outlaw 
slavery in the District of Columbia and in the territories. Once again, 
given that Congress has a police power in these places akin to the 
police powers of states within their territories, this would seem like an 
obvious proposition. And, yet, it was vehemently denied by proslavery 
Democrats in Congress, beginning with an 1836 report of a special 
committee of the House of Representatives that claimed abolishing 
slavery would deny slaveholders their property rights in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.80 Twenty years later 
in Dred Scot, Chief Justice Taney would extend the same Due Process 
clause reasoning to the territories.81 
 
76. Charles Dexter Cleveland, Prefatory Remarks to Salmon Portland 
Chase, The Address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention 
(June 11, 1845) [hereinafter Liberty Convention Address] in Salmon 
Portland Chase & Charles Dexter Cleveland, Anti-Slavery 
Addresses of 1844 and 1845, at 72 (1867). 
77. Chase, Liberty Convention Address, supra note 76, at 101. 
78. Id. at 121. 
79. Id. 
80. See Barnett supra note 1, at 179–80 (discussing the Due Process Clause 
reasoning of the House select committee report and the antislavery 
response developed by Theodore Dwight Weld). 
81.  Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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Yet, if Chase and the other constitutional abolitionists were right in 
their reading of the Constitution, and Story and Taney were wrong, 
then this means that, while the Constitution accommodated slavery in 
the states in which it already existed, the Constitution was otherwise 
an antislavery document. And, if this is so, then the persistent criticism 
of the Founders for having ratified slavery is, at best, an exaggeration. 
In his 1845 Cincinnati address, Chase reiterated the standard 
abolitionist positions that “slaveholding is contrary to natural right 
and justice” and therefore “can subsist nowhere without the sanction 
and aid of positive legislation.”82 From the fact that the Constitution, 
“expressly prohibits Congress from depriving any person of liberty 
without due process of law,”83 Chase derived the following antislavery 
political program: 
(1) “repealing all legislation, and discontinuing all action, in 
favor of slavery, at home and abroad;”  
(2) “prohibiting the practice of slaveholding in all places of 
exclusive national jurisdiction, in the District of Columbia, 
in American vessels upon the seas, in forts, arsenals, navy 
yards;”  
(3) “forbidding the employment of slaves upon any public work;”  
(4) “adopting resolutions in Congress, declaring that 
slaveholding, in all States created out of national territories, 
is unconstitutional, and recommending to the others the 
immediate adoption of measures for its extinction within 
their respective limits;” and  
(5) electing and appointing to public office only those who 
“openly avow our principles, and will honestly carry out our 
measures.”84 
Chase maintained that the “constitutionality of this line of action 
cannot be successfully impeached.”85  
Chase’s program was enormously influential. Historian Harold 
Hyman described Chase as “the antislavery crusaders’ premier legal 
strategist.”86 Historian Eric Foner has observed that, in these and 
other strenuous efforts, “Chase developed an interpretation of 
American history which convinced thousands of northerners that anti-
 
82. Chase, Liberty Convention Address, supra note 76, at 101. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 100. 
85. Id. 
86. Hyman, supra note 34, at 168. 
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slavery was the intended policy of the founders of the nation, and was 
fully compatible with the Constitution.”87 Within a few years, it 
provided the core position of a new antislavery political party that 
would supplant the Whigs and capture the presidency and Congress. 
“Chase’s interpretation of the Constitution,” wrote Foner, “formed 
the legal basis for the political program which was created by the 
Liberty Party and inherited in large part by the Free Soilers and 
Republicans.”88 “[B]ecause of Chase’s efforts,” this antislavery 
interpretation of the Constitution “eventually came to form the 
constitutional basis of the Republican Party program.”89  
That the Republican Party’s national platforms for the elections 
of 1856 and 1860 largely adopted Chase’s constitutional views on 
slavery helps explain why Lincoln’s victory in 1860 provoked the 
Southern states to secede. Though Lincoln insisted he would not 
interfere with slavery where it existed—a doctrine on which Chase 
also insisted over the vigorous dissent of Lysander Spooner and some 
other constitutional abolitionists—Southerners apparently feared that 
the Republican program would hasten the extinction of slavery 
throughout the United States. 
The Liberty Party included many who, like Spooner, believed 
slavery to be unconstitutional within the existing slave states. Its 
strategy was to take enough votes away from the Whigs and 
Democrats that they would have to accommodate its antislavery 
demands.90 When the single-issue, antislavery Liberty Party failed to 
provide the leverage between the Whigs and Democrats its founders 
were seeking, they attempted to broaden their appeal by founding the 
Free Soil Party around an antislavery program that conceded the 
power of existing states to perpetuate slavery within their borders—as 
Chase had long maintained.91 (Because of this, the Liberty Party 
continued in greatly diminished form.92) Chase coined its motto: “Free 
Soil, Free Labor and Free Men.”93 
Because he conceded that slavery was constitutional in the 
original slave states, today Chase is considered to be an “antislavery” 
 
87. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of 
the Republican Party Before the Civil War 73 (1970). 
88. Id. at 87. 
89. Id. at 75. 
90. See Sewell, supra note 3, at 43–79 (describing the formation and 
strategy of the Liberty Party). Spooner himself remained apolitical, 
though he generally kept these views quiet lest he alienate his fans 
among the political abolitionists. 
91. See id. at 170–201 (describing formation of the Free Soil Party). 
92. See id. at 247. 
93. See Niven, supra note 10, at 110.  
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moderate, with the term “abolitionist” reserved to those “radicals” 
who would see slavery abolished throughout the Union. But Sewell 
makes clear that this “dispute was one among friends, since both sides 
equally desired the overthrow of slavery everywhere.”94 As Sewell puts 
it, “the great mass of Free Soilers were as much committed to 
uprooting slavery everywhere as were the most dedicated 
Garrisonians.”95 Indeed, given that the Garrisonian abolitionists 
maintained that the Constitution was a proslavery document because 
they too believed it authorized slavery in the South, the distinction 
between abolitionist and antislavery becomes considerably muddy 
when the interpretation of the Constitution is at issue. 
From 1849 to 1855, Chase served as a United States Senator from 
Ohio as a member of the Free Soil Party.96 The manner by which he 
attained this position would haunt him politically for the rest of his 
career. When the Free Soilers successfully obtained the balance of 
power in the 1848 election for the state legislature, Chase struck a 
deal with the Democrats whereby they would agree to abolish the 
black codes that imposed legal discrimination on Ohio’s free blacks, 
and they would vote to name Chase a U.S. Senator.97 The Democrats 
agreed to, and fulfilled, both conditions. 
This deal infuriated the disappointed Whigs from the Northern 
part of the state and they would never forget or forgive Chase for 
what they said was his ruthless ambition. “It lost to him at once and 
forever the confidence of every Whig of middle age in Ohio,” said one 
fellow politician.98 “Its shadow never wholly dispelled, always fell 
upon him, and hovered near and darkened his pathway at critical 
places in his political after life.”99 Twelve years later, the Whig 
enmity towards the ex-Democrat Chase lingered. In part because the 
Ohio delegation to the 1860 Republican presidential convention in 
Chicago was divided, with some of his nominal Ohio supporters 
working against him behind the scenes, Chase’s candidacy for 
President was fatally undermined, eventually allowing the former-
Whig Abraham Lincoln to capture the nomination.100 
In Washington as a Free Soiler, Chase was marginalized in the 
Senate. Still, he forged lasting bonds with the few other antislavery 
senators he met there, most notably Massachusetts Senator Charles 
Sumner, the only other Free Soiler, who in 1851, like Chase two years 
 
94. Sewell, supra note 3, at 90. 
95. Id. at 189. 
96.  Id. at 204–06. 
97.  Id. at 180. 
98.  Goodwin, supra note 6, at 136. 
99. Id. 
100.  See id. 
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before, had been sent to the Senate in a deal struck with Democrats. 
Sumner considered Chase to be among his closest and most principled 
allies in the fight against the Southern Slave Power.101 In one lengthy 
floor speech, Democrat Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois 
repeatedly condemned Sumner and Chase together as the “abo-
litionist confederates,” saying they were “the pure, unadulterated 
representatives of Abolitionism, Free Soilism, Niggerism in the 
Congress of the United States.”102  
In opposing the repeal of the Missouri Comprise, “Chase assumed 
the leadership of the antislavery forces.”103 In collaboration with 
Sumner and Joshua Giddings, he drafted an “Appeal of the 
Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United 
States,” which was “a brilliantly effective piece of antislavery 
propaganda.”104 “[T]he Appeal was reprinted in pamphlet form to 
organize opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act.”105 Chase’s past 
connections to the more radical elements in Congress would be a 
potent source of his clout during the Lincoln presidency. 
After the formation of the Republican Party, Chase was elected 
the governor of Ohio in 1855 on the Republican ticket, making him 
the first Republican governor in any state and the highest Republican 
office-holder in the country at that time.106 After successfully dealing 
with a financial crisis involving the embezzlement by the outgoing 
Democratic treasurer of some half a million dollars, Chase was 
reelected Governor in 1857. The Ohio governorship was a largely 
powerless position, but Chase was responsible for shepherding several 
antislavery resolutions through the legislature. 
After he failed in his bid for the Republican presidential 
nomination, the Ohio legislature returned Chase to the Senate, this 
time as a Republican, in 1861. When Lincoln appointed him secretary 
of the treasury, Chase vacated his Senate seat after serving all of two 
days. (He was replaced by Clevelander and former-Whig John 
Sherman, the future author of the Sherman Antitrust Act and brother 
of Union General William Tecumseh Sherman.)  
 
101. Chase’s close relationship with Sumner is discussed throughout David 
Herbert Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil 
War (Sourcebooks, 2009). Chase comes off better in Sumner’s 
biography than he does in his own, most likely reflecting Sumner’s high 
regard for his Free Soil antislavery colleague. 
102. Id. at 210. 
103. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 161. 
104. Donald, supra note 101, at 210. It was the “Appeal” that provoked the 
wrath of Douglas who was sponsoring the repeal of the Compromise. Id. 
105. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 162. 
106. Niven, supra note 10, at 175–76. Except where noted, the biographical 
details in the next several paragraphs are taken from this source. 
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Chase’s “appointment of thousands of Treasury agents, many of 
whom were black and/or female, was an important step toward the 
nationwide implementation of one of his major goals: broadening 
opportunities for segments of society usually neglected in mid-
nineteenth-century urban America.”107 Chase was “alone among 
cabinet heads [when he] hired thousands of blacks and females as civil 
servants and even placed an impressive number of black males in 
supervisory positions over white females.”108 Also, “[a]lone among 
Lincoln’s cabinet, Chase openly called for the abolition of slavery as 
early as 1862 and privately criticized the president for being so 
dilatory on the subject.”109  
At the beginning of the war when Union casualties overwhelmed 
the hospitals in Washington, Secretary Chase, like others, opened his 
large house at Sixth and E as a hospital ward. Among the gravely 
wounded soldiers who were nursed there was future Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.110  
As treasury secretary, Chase was charged with the herculean task 
of financing the Civil War, preferably without raising taxes. His 
success at this endeavor made him invaluable to Lincoln’s 
administration. “Chase had been indispensable to the war effort. More 
than any other member of Lincoln’s cabinet, he realized the need for 
fiscal solvency as well as military supremacy if the Union was to 
survive.”111 Eventually, and reluctantly given his views of hard 
money, Chase acquiesced to the Republicans’ plan for paper money. 
But never shy about promoting himself politically, Chase saw to it 
that his picture appeared on the one dollar bill,112 earning him the 
new nickname of “Old Mr. Greenbacks”—a title that, as we will see, 
later became ironic. 
Chase’s supreme competence in financing the war, along with his 
close ties to the radical Republicans in Congress, gave him political 
leverage with Lincoln, the former Whig, who came late in his career to 
the antislavery cause and who was distrusted by the radicals. Initially, 
Chase’s working relationship with Lincoln was warm. Early in the war, 
they sojourned together on a treasury cutter off the coast of Virginia, 
where, with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, they would plan a 
 
107. Jonathan Lurie, The Chase Court 22 (2004). 
108. Hyman, supra note 34, at 81. 
109. Lurie, supra note 107, at 23. 
110. Niven, supra note 10, at 269. 
111. Lurie, supra note 107, at 22. 
112. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 510. Chase’s picture later adorned the 
$10,000 bill. 
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military invasion to secure the port of Norfolk. The three men even 
personally went ashore to survey possible sites for landing troops.113 
Over time, however, Chase’s often stiff and prickly personality, 
his incessant criticisms of Lincoln’s vacillation, coupled with his 
public political maneuvering for the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1864, put Chase at odds with the President.114 As 
Lincoln became increasingly close to his Secretary of State, William 
Seward, his relationship with his Secretary of Treasury deteriorated. 
In June of that year, after Chase protested Lincoln’s appointment of 
someone to the Treasury department without his approval, Chase 
tendered his resignation (as he had done several times before). Chase 
expected Lincoln to yield, but he miscalculated. By this time, 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, as well as the success of the 
military campaign, had greatly raised Lincoln’s own standing with the 
radicals in Congress. He could now afford to be rid of his difficult 
secretary.  
So, to Chase’s surprise, Lincoln accepted Chase’s resignation with 
considerable relief.115 When a number of Chase supporters protested 
privately to Lincoln, knowing his words would get back to Chase, he 
reassured them that, “if I have the opportunity, I will make him Chief 
Justice of the United States.”116 Perhaps in part because of this, when 
Chase’s bid for the 1864 Republican presidential nomination quickly 
collapsed, he nevertheless actively campaigned for Lincoln and the 
Republicans, traveling by train, boat, and horseback throughout 
Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri.117 
Such travel was arduous under the best of circumstances, but these 
were dangerous times. “En route to Toledo Chase was recognized and 
several McClellan Democrats tried to force him off the train. He held 
his ground and reached his destination safely.”118  
 Among the towns at which Chase spoke during the 1864 
campaign was Covington, Kentucky, where he had previously spoken 
on Lincoln’s behalf in 1860, and where the Northern Kentucky 
University’s Salmon P. Chase College of Law is now named after him. 
On that day in October when Chase spoke in Covington, Chief 
 
113. For two accounts of this remarkable tale, see Niven, supra note 10, at 
287–89, and Goodwin, supra note 6, at 436–39. 
114. Chase’s relationship with Lincoln is vividly described at length in 
Goodwin, supra note 6, at 280–639. 
115. See id. at 631–39 (describing the events surrounding Chase’s 
resignation). 
116. Id. at 635. 
117. Id. at 657. 
118. Niven, supra note 10, at 373.  
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Justice Roger Taney died.119 When Lincoln came under pressure by 
several of Chase’s powerful rivals for the Chief Justiceship, he 
characteristically delayed his decision. But as soon as his reelection 
was secured, Lincoln nominated Chase, his political nemesis, to be the 
sixth Chief Justice of the United States.  
In a remarkable turn of events, the racist author of Dred Scott 
was succeeded as Chief Justice by Salmon Portland Chase, the 
“attorney general for fugitive slaves.”120 Lincoln assured critics of his 
pick that “[h]e trusted that Chase would help secure the right of the 
black man, for which he had fought throughout his career, a belief 
that outweighed concerns about Chase’s restless temperament.”121 
II. The Chief Justiceship of Salmon P. Chase 
A. Chase’s Duties as Chief Justice 
On March 4, 1864, Chief Justice of the United States, Salmon P. 
Chase, administered the oath of office to his political rival Abraham 
Lincoln, inaugurating Lincoln’s second term. The evening before, 
Chase was visited in his Sixth Street home by the radical abolitionist 
orator, and future U.S. Marshall of the District of Columbia, 
Frederick Douglass. Douglass recalled helping Chase’s dynamic 
daughter Kate “in placing over her honored father’s shoulders the new 
robe then being made in which he was to administer the oath to the 
reelected President.”122 Douglass recalled the “early anti-slavery days” 
of their first meeting, when Chase had “welcomed [Douglass] to his 
home and his table when to do so was a strange thing.”123 
Douglass’s faith in Chase was not to be disappointed. Chase 
readily agreed to the proposal by his friend Charles Sumner that 
Massachusetts attorney John Rock be admitted to the Supreme Court 
bar. The previous year, Rock, a black, had been denied admission by 
the Taney Court on the basis of his race. Now, upon Sumner’s formal 
motion, Rock was sworn in as the first black lawyer admitted to the 
Supreme Court bar. Harper’s Weekly observed that this event 
represented an “extraordinary reversal” of Dred Scott, and would “be 
regarded by the future historian as a remarkable indication of the 
revolution which is going on in the sentiment of a great people.”124 
 
119. Id. 
120. Foner, supra note 87, at 77. 
121. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 681. 
122. Id. at 697. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 681 (quoting John H. Rock, Colored Counselor, 9 Harper’s 
Wkly. 124 (February 25, 1865)). 
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When Lincoln was murdered by the Maryland-born actor and 
Southern sympathizer John Wilkes Booth on April 14, 1865, Chief 
Justice Chase administered the oath of office to Vice President 
Andrew Johnson, a Democrat from Tennessee. Two years later, when 
Johnson was impeached by the Republican House of Representatives 
for resisting its efforts to “reconstruct” the South, Chase presided over 
his trial in the Senate. 
Without any precedent to guide him, the physically imposing 
Chase swept into the Senate chamber in his flowing judicial robes, 
dramatically dominating the scene.125 Chase assumed control of the 
proceedings and insisted on them being administered as a judicial 
rather than a political tribunal. In part because of this, Johnson 
escaped conviction and removal from office by a single vote.  
Chase conducted Johnson’s trial “in a manner that diminished 
public anxiety about a rigged judgment either way and so fended off 
possibly recrudescing mob violence.”126 But it also cost him political 
support among congressional Republicans. “[O]ld comrades of the 
antislavery crusade berated him for his scrupulously neutral conduct 
during the impeachment. His relative evenhandedness at the trial . . . 
helped to kill his chances to be either party’s 1868 presidential 
candidate . . . .”127  
B. Chase’s Opinions on Reconstruction 
As Chief Justice, Chase had two opinions affecting Reconstruction 
that vindicated Lincoln’s confidence in him. One, Texas v. White, is 
well known, though criticized. The other, In re Turner, a case he 
decided while riding circuit, is now forgotten.128  
1. In re Turner 
In re Turner129 involved Elizabeth Turner, a “young person of 
color” in Maryland who was freed after the passage of its new 
Constitution.130 After her emancipation, she and others were gathered 
by local authorities and pressed into apprenticeships, typically to 
their previous owners. The century-long fight by Southern Democrats 
to reimpose the subordination of the freed blacks after the abolition of 
 
125. Niven, supra note 10, at 3–4. 
126. Hyman, supra note 34, at 167. 
127. Id. at 138. 
128. See generally Hyman, supra note 34 (discussing the significance of In re 
Turner and Texas v. White); Lurie, supra note 107, at 26–27, 67–68 
(same). 
129.  In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
130. Hyman, supra note 34, at 124. The facts surrounding Turner related in 
the following paragraphs are taken from id. at 124–26 unless otherwise 
noted. 
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slavery was just beginning. Turner’s apprenticeship to her former 
master had been entered into by her mother on her behalf. After she 
came of age, Turner brought suit for her freedom.  
In 1867, Chase heard the case as a circuit court judge in the same 
courtroom in which Chief Justice Taney delivered his circuit court 
opinion in Ex Parte Merryman.131 Turner’s lawyer argued that 
Turner’s apprenticeship contract, entered into by her mother, violated 
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  
In a case of first impression, Chase agreed and issued a writ of 
habeas corpus for Turner. Chase ruled that the apprenticeship 
contract constituted involuntary servitude in violation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.132 He also ruled that, because it did not 
conform to Maryland regulations concerning indentures of whites, the 
indenture was also in violation of the Civil Rights Act.133 He then 
went on to rule that the Civil Rights Act was constitutional under 
Congress’s enforcement powers under the Thirteenth Amendment—a 
then-controversial position, even among some Republicans in 
Congress.134 Notably, his decision affirmed that a woman such as 
Turner was among those protected by both the Thirteenth 
Amendment and by the reference to “all persons” in the Civil Rights 
Act. As we will see, this assumption about the legal equality of 
women will reappear at the end of Chase’s life. 
Harold Hyman tells us that Chase hoped that the Turner case 
would make it to the Supreme Court to provide a national platform 
on which “to clarify in concrete, workaday terms the ways that the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act had altered 
federalism.”135 To Chase, “even a black female juvenile who as a slave 
had almost no legal rights was [now] a national citizen, according to 
the Civil Rights Act,”136 a proposition that was not completely 
accepted until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chase 
 
131. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) 
(holding that Congress, and not the President, has the power to suspend 
habeas corpus). President Lincoln disregarded this decision. 
132.  In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339 (“The first clause of the thirteenth 
amendment to the constitution of the United States interdicts slavery 
and involuntary servitude . . . . The alleged apprenticeship in the 
present case is involuntary servitude, within the meaning of these words 
in the amendment.”). 
133.  Id. (“[T]he indenture set forth in the return does not contain important 
provisions for the security and benefit of the apprentice which are 
required by the laws of Maryland in indenture of white apprentices, and 
is, therefore, in contravention of [the Civil Rights Act] . . . .”). 
134.  Id. 
135. Hyman, supra note 34, at 131. 
136. Id. 
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believed that his Turner decision “resolved inarguably not only the 
issue of blacks’ legal rights and status of both in the former slave 
states and throughout the nation but also of all Americans’ basic civil 
rights.”137 According to Hyman, “Elizabeth Turner’s situation caught 
Chase’s conscience because slavery, though illegal, was regenerating 
under covert guises provided by states’ black codes.”138 
Turner never made it to the Supreme Court. But Chase’s 1867 
ruling protecting the citizenship rights of blacks, and other like 
actions, contributed to his failure to capture the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1868.139 Some Democrats hoped, with the 
antislavery activist Chase as its standard bearer, “the party could 
advertise itself as purged of Copperheadism, a reformed and penitent 
new party.”140 But “Chase and his supporters failed adequately to 
gauge the passion with which unregenerate Democrats viewed his 
antislavery past, wartime record, role in the Johnson impeachment, 
and postwar rulings on the legal status of emancipated blacks like 
Elizabeth Turner.”141 At the same time, his impartial conduct while 
presiding over Johnson’s impeachment trial in the Senate in 1867 
alienated him from some of his former radical Republican allies.142  
Whatever else can be said about Chase’s presidential ambitions, 
he always expected the presidency on his terms, rather than deviate 
from his core principles to acquire his coveted prize. Perhaps this fact 
undercuts to some degree the harsh assessments of his character 
discussed below. 
2. Texas v. White 
In Texas v. White143 the Court considered a claim by the 
provisional reconstruction government of Texas that United States 
bonds owned by Texas since 1850 had been illegally sold by the 
Confederate state legislature during the American Civil War.144 The 
 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 135. 
139. See id. at 133 (“[In re Turner] imposed federal standards on private 
labor contracts sanctioned by a state and on behalf of a black 
woman. . . . [Such a ruling] made Chase politically unacceptable as a 
presidential candidate in 1868 to white social conservatives in both 
parties, North and South, but particularly unacceptable to Democrats.”). 
140. Id. at 142. 
141. Id. 
142. See id. at 138 (noting that Chase’s “evenhandedness at the 
[impeachment] trial . . . helped to kill his chances to be either party’s 
1868 presidential candidate”). 
143. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). 
144. The facts surrounding Texas v. White are taken from Hyman, supra 
note 34, at 140–50. See also Lurie, supra note 107, at 67–68. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013  
The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase 
680 
Court ruled that Texas had remained a state ever since it first joined 
the Union, despite its joining the Confederate States of America and 
its being under military rule at the time of the decision in the case. 
For this reason, the ordinances of secession, and all the acts of the 
legislatures within seceding states intended to give effect to such 
ordinances, were “absolutely null.”145 
The case was politically tricky. By the time the suit was filed, 
Republicans in Congress were opposing President Johnson’s 
reconstruction policy of extending swift recognition of southern state 
governments upon their ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Some Republicans began to abandon the position adopted by Lincoln 
and others that the states had never left the Union. Instead, they 
considered the South as legally similar to conquered provinces over 
which they could exercise the same authority as they had to regulate 
territories. On this theory, the Supreme Court should reject 
jurisdiction in the case because Texas, as yet, had no legally 
recognized government. 
Conversely, Democrats wanted the Court to acknowledge the 
existence of an official state government in Texas. Such a ruling 
would have the effect of accepting Texas as fully restored to its place 
in the Union and thus render unconstitutional the Military 
Reconstruction Act, which listed Texas as a “rebel State[ ]” with 
reduced status.146 Wall Street was also concerned with the case, being 
opposed to any actions that threatened bondholders and investors. 
For this reason, as Hyman observes, Chase’s decision to assign himself 
the writing of the majority opinion, rather than dodge the task, was 
not one that “a truly driven would-be presidential candidate or mere 
placeholder” would have made.147 
In his opinion upholding the jurisdiction of the Court, Chase 
began by identifying what is meant by “state.” He distinguished the 
territory and people of a state, which remained in the Union, from its 
government, which was hostile to the United States and therefore 
properly unrepresented in Congress. In the text of the Constitution, 
wrote Chase, “a plain distinction is made between a State and the 
government of a State.”148 
Chase then affirmed Lincoln’s position that the Southern states, 
properly defined, had never legally left the Union. Although the states 
continued to maintain their separate existence, they were bound in 
perpetuity to the Union until they received its consent for them to 
secede. The Articles of Confederation, said Chase, had “solemnly 
 
145. White, 74 U.S. at 726. 
146.  Hyman, supra note 34, at 146. 
147. Id. at 147. 
148. White, 74 U.S. at 721. 
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declared” this union to “be perpetual.”149 And the Constitution was 
created “to form a more perfect Union.”150 “What can be 
indissoluble,” he asked, “if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is 
not?”151 In what may be the most famous line of any Chase opinion, 
he wrote: “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”152 
So, when  
Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an 
indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and 
all the guaranties of republican government in the Union, 
attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her 
admission into the Union was something more than a compact; 
it was the incorporation of a new member into the political 
body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other 
States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the 
union between the original States. There was no place for 
reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution or 
through consent of the States.153 
Because the government of the state of Texas was acting uncon-
stitutionally and illegally when it refused its obedience to the 
Constitution, it could properly be denied representation in Congress 
until it was reconstructed to establish a republican form of 
government for all its citizens, including those persons who had been 
emancipated from bondage. But because both presidential and 
congressional reconstruction policies had resurrected its government, 
that provisional government had standing to sue. 
Having affirmed that the state of Texas had remained within the 
Union, what was the legal status of the actions taken by its 
government while it was in open rebellion against the United States? 
Chase answered that there were two categories of state action. First 
were those acts that are “necessary to peace and good order among 
citizens, such for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage 
and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, 
regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, 
and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate . . . .”154 
These and other similar acts, “would be valid if emanating from a 
lawful government,” and therefore “must be regarded in general as 
 
149. Id. at 725. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 726. 
154. Id. at 733. 
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valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful, 
government.”155 
In contrast were acts “in furtherance or support of rebellion 
against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of 
citizens.”156 These “and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be 
regarded as invalid and void.”157 Because the particular act of the 
rebellious government of Texas in selling the bonds, unlike many of 
its other actions of maintaining the peace, was done in aid of treason 
and insurrection, it was null and void. “It follows that the title of the 
State was not divested by the act of the insurgent government in 
entering into this contract.”158 
Chase’s distinction between the territory and people of a state 
and its government harkened back to the Supreme Court’s first great 
constitutional decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,159 where the Court 
found that, because sovereignty resided in the people as individuals 
rather than in the government of their state, individuals of one state 
may sue the government of the other, as apparently authorized by the 
Constitution, and that state governments cannot plead sovereign 
immunity in defense.160 
Chase’s opinion also harkened back to his ruling in Turner that 
blacks were now citizens of the United States. After grounding the 
authority of Congress to suppress the rebellion in “the power to 
suppress insurrection and carry on war,” he derived the power to 
reconstruct the governments of the rebellious states from “the 
obligation of the United States to guarantee to every State in the 
Union a republican form of government.”161 Because “[t]he new 
freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the people still 
constituted the State,” he concluded, “it was the State, thus 
constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the 
constitutional guaranty.”162 In other words, the freeman were part of 
the people who deserved representation in any republican government, 
 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 734. 
159. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
160. See Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia 
and Popular Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1729 (2007) (discussing the 
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and it was Congress’s constitutional duty to guarantee to them that 
form of government by means of reconstruction.163 
Had Chase been guided solely by his political ambition, he would 
have attempted to please either the Republicans, by denying 
jurisdiction, or the Democrats, by upholding the sale of the bonds and 
vindicating the legal status of the existing government of Texas, 
which would then entitle it, and all other states with provisional 
governments, to immediate representation in Congress. Instead, his 
decision in Texas v. White pleased no one entirely, while remaining 
true to his vision of the Union, which he shared with the murdered 
President who had nominated him to be Chief Justice.  
C. Chase on the Enumerated Powers of Congress 
Chase decided two cases concerning the scope of Congress’s power 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause that continue to resonate 
today. The first is still good law, and is consistent with the majority 
in NFIB v. Sebelius164 who found that the Affordable Care Act’s 
individual insurance mandate was beyond the power of Congress 
under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. The second 
was quickly reversed by the Court itself after the completion of what 
amounted to a court packing scheme by Congressional Republicans. 
1. United States v. Dewitt 
The very first Supreme Court decision invalidating an act of 
Congress for exceeding its powers under the Commerce Clause was 
United States v. Dewitt.165 In 1867, Congress enacted a law 
prohibiting both the interstate and intrastate sale of a mixture of 
“naphtha and illuminating oils” or “oil made from petroleum for 
illuminating purposes, inflammable at less temperature or fire-test 
than 110 degrees Fahrenheit.”166 The violation of this prohibition was 
a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.167 In his opinion 
for the Court, Chief Justice Chase posed the question presented as 
whether “Congress [has] power, under the Constitution, to prohibit 
trade within the limits of a State?”168 
 
163. Other more radical constitutional abolitionists had contended that this 
had always been the case, and therefore the Guarantee Clause 
empowered Congress to protect blacks even in states that authorized 
slavery. See William M. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution 136–37 (1972). 
164. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
165. United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870).  
166. Id. at 42. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 43. 
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Chase began his analysis by affirming the following first 
principle: The “express grant of power to regulate commerce among 
the States has always been understood as limited by its terms; and 
as a virtual denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade 
and business of the separate States.”169 Notice that Chase referred 
not merely to the internal commerce of a state, but also to its 
“trade and business,” which is a broader category.170 The only 
exception to the prohibition on congressional interference with the 
internal trade and business of states, Chase said, is when doing so is 
“a necessary and proper means for carrying into execution some 
other power expressly granted or vested.”171 
First, he rejected the analogy to a statute that uses the tax power 
to regulate “the business of distilling liquors, and the mode of packing 
various manufactured articles.”172 The analogy fails because, with the 
statute under consideration, “no tax is imposed on the oils the sale of 
which is prohibited.”173 In short, Chief Justice Chase distinguished 
between penalizing conduct and taxing it. Here the statute (a) ex-
pressly prohibited the conduct in question and (b) punished violations 
of the prohibition with fine or punishment or both. Hence, the statute 
itself was not an exercise of the tax power. 
Chase then considered the argument that the prohibition of the 
sale of the illuminating oil described in the statute “was in aid and 
support of the internal revenue tax imposed on other illuminating 
oils.”174 By this reasoning, prohibiting these oils would lead people to 
use the other illuminating oils that were being taxed, thereby 
“increasing the production and sale of other oils, and, consequently, 
the revenue derived from them.”175 He dismissed this assertion of 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause as “too 
remote and too uncertain to warrant us in saying that the prohibition 
is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying into 
execution the power of laying and collecting taxes.”176 And he reached 
 
169. Id. at 44. 
170. Id. For a discussion of the original meaning of “commerce,” see Randy 
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 847 (2003); Randy 
E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 623. 
171. Dewitt, 76 U.S. at 44. 
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this conclusion notwithstanding that the prohibition was included in 
“an act imposing internal duties.”177 
“Standing by itself,” wrote Chase, this “is plainly a regulation of 
police.”178 To this he added that it was  
so considered, if not by the Congress which enacted it, certainly 
by the succeeding Congress, may be inferred from the 
circumstance, that while all special taxes on illuminating oils 
were repealed by the act of July 20th, 1868, which subjected 
distillers and refiners to the tax on sales as manufacturers, this 
prohibition was left unrepealed.179  
Chase ended his opinion by invoking the same theory of 
federalism that, years before, had led him to contend that, while 
Congress could ban slavery in the District of Columbia and the 
territories under its control, it could not prohibit the practice within 
the original states. Because the law in question is “a police regulation, 
relating exclusively to the internal trade of the States,” he reasoned, 
“it can only have effect where the legislative authority of Congress 
excludes, territorially, all State legislation, as for example, in the 
District of Columbia. Within State limits, it can have no constitu-
tional operation.”180 For Chase, this proposition was “so frequently 
declared by this court, results so obviously from the terms of the 
Constitution, and has been so fully explained and supported on 
former occasions, that we think it unnecessary to enter again upon 
the discussion.”181 
The relevance of Dewitt to the constitutional challenge to the 
Affordable Care Act182 did not go unnoticed during that litigation. 
The case was relied upon by the National Federation of Independent 
Business in its brief to the Court.183 But, although this precedent by 
his predecessor went unmentioned by Chief Justice Roberts in his 
opinion for the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius,184 his reasoning about the 
tax power takes at least some of Dewitt’s holding into account. 
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180. Id. at 45. 
181. Id. (citations omitted). 
182. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
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In his NFIB opinion, Chief Justice Roberts adopted what he 
called a “saving construction” by rewriting the individual insurance 
mandate to eliminate the “requirement” that everyone purchase 
private health insurance.185 Section 5000A of the Affordable Care Act 
“reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax,” 
he wrote, and he “would uphold it as a command if the Constitution 
allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power 
question.”186 Although the statute expressly speaks of a “requirement” 
to purchase qualifying health insurance,187 like Chief Justice Chase 
concluded of the prohibition in Dewitt, Chief Justice Roberts flatly 
affirmed that “Section 5000A would . . . be unconstitutional if read as 
a command” under both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.188 
Discarding the “requirement” in the statute, Roberts adopted the 
saving construction that “[t]hose subject to the individual mandate 
may lawfully forgo health insurance and pay higher taxes, or buy 
health insurance and pay lower taxes.”189 He then upheld the 
“penalty” in § 5000A standing alone as a tax, in part because it is not 
so punitive as to coerce people to purchase health insurance, which 
would render the mandate an unconstitutional command. “[W]e need 
not here decide the precise point at which an exaction becomes so 
punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it.”190 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, however, skirted the issue that 
Chase squarely considered in Dewitt: Did Congress consider § 5000A 
to be a Commerce Clause regulation or a tax? In Dewitt, Chase 
considered the question and answered in the negative. Roberts elided 
the question by rejecting the “more natural[ ]”191 reading of the 
statute, which would best evidence congressional intent, and then 
adopting his “saving construction” without regard to whether or not 
Congress intended the “penalty” to be a tax. 
On the basis of his opinion in Dewitt, I think there is little 
question that Chief Justice Chase would agree with Chief Justice 
Roberts that the more natural reading of § 5000A is as a penalty 
enforcing a prohibition, which is beyond the enumerated power of 
Congress. Although it went uncited, Dewitt, therefore, both supports 
this aspect of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and remains good law. 
 
185. Id. at 2600–01. 
186. Id. at 2600. 
187. § 5000A, 124 Stat. at 244. 
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191. Id. at 2600–01. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013  
The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase 
687 
The Dewitt case is noteworthy in another respect. Having been 
decided in 1869, it undermines the narrative that the judicial 
enforcement of limits on the Commerce power—beginning 1895 with 
E.C. Knight192 and continuing up until 1935 in Schechter Poultry193—
was a judicial invention reflecting the more conservative Justices’ 
disapproval of progressive and populist legislation. If the judicial 
enforcement of the limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce 
and Necessary and Proper Clauses is a judicial invention, it is one 
that began some eighty years after the adoption of the Constitution, 
and well before the rise of the Progressive and Populist movements, 
which sought to label the Supreme Court activist for enforcing the 
enumerated powers scheme. 
2. The Legal Tender Cases 
Chase’s stance in the Legal Tender Cases is much better known. 
In the 1869 case of Hepburn v. Griswold,194 he wrote the majority 
opinion that laws compelling contracting parties to accept paper 
money in settlement of debts—called “legal tender laws”—were 
unconstitutional. After the appointment of two additional Justices by 
President Grant, this decision was reversed just two years later in 
Knox v. Lee.195 
Hepburn and Knox—like Prigg and Dewitt—are actually 
Necessary and Proper Clause cases. In Hepburn, Chase began by 
reaffirming the first principle he had enunciated in Dewitt: “[I]t is 
generally, if not universally, conceded, that the government of the 
United States is one of limited powers, and that no department 
possesses any authority not granted by the Constitution.”196 Chase 
never questioned the existence of implied powers, though he noted 
that “the extension of power by implication was regarded with some 
apprehension by the wise men who framed, and by the intelligent 
citizens who adopted, the Constitution.”197 He found evidence for this 
concern in the wording of both the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
the Tenth Amendment.198 
Sometimes the Legal Tender Cases are loosely described as 
involving the power to issue paper money. But Chase identified the 
power being asserted by Congress, not as the power to issue paper 
notes, a power he says was held by Congress under the Articles of 
 
192. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
193. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
194. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870). 
195. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). 
196. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 613. 
197. Id. 
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Confederation, but as the power to make these notes a “legal 
tender.”199 This requires that they be accepted as settlement of debts 
even by those who stipulated in their contracts for payment in specie. 
Is this power both necessary and proper for carrying into execution an 
enumerated power? 
As he did in Dewitt, Chase then sought to apply the standard 
provided by McCulloch v. Maryland.200 After identifying the power in 
question, Chase first considered whether it is “implied in, or incidental 
to” any enumerated power, such as the power to coin money.201 The 
power to make paper notes a legal tender “is certainly not the same 
power as the power to coin money. Nor is it in any reasonable or 
satisfactory sense an appropriate or plainly adapted means to the exercise 
of that power.”202 Neither is the power claimed “implied in, or incidental 
to, the power to regulate the value of coined money of the United States, 
or of foreign coins.”203 Chase defined this as “a power to determine the 
weight, purity, form, impression, and denomination of the several coins, 
and their relation to each other, and the relations of foreign coins to the 
monetary unit of the United States.”204 
Much like the Court in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chase distinguished 
between the concepts of “necessary” and “proper.” Unlike the modern 
doctrine that largely defers to Congress’s assessment of “necessity,” 
Chase addressed this issue. “[W]hatever benefit is possible from that 
compulsion to some individuals or to the government,” Chase 
recognized that “there is abundant evidence” that this benefit “is far 
more than outweighed by the losses of property, the derangement of 
business, the fluctuations of currency and values, and the increase of 
prices to the people and the government, and the long train of evils 
which flow from the use of irredeemable paper money.”205  
Applying the standard from McCulloch, Chase considered whether 
this measure is “plainly adapted” to any enumerated power. As to the 
power to declare and carry on war, because “it adds nothing to the 
utility of the notes, it cannot be upheld as a means to the end in 
furtherance of which the notes are issued.”206 Further, “while 
facilitating in some degree the circulation of the notes, it debases and 
 
199. Id. at 616.  
200. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
201. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 616.  
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injures the currency in its proper use to a much greater degree.”207 For 
the same reason, Chase found this measure is not justified under the 
powers to regulate commerce or to borrow money. “Both powers 
necessarily involve the use of money by the people and by the 
government, but neither, as we think, carries with it as an appropriate 
and plainly adapted means to its exercise, the power of making 
circulating notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts.”208 
Although the modern Court might shy away from so fact bound 
an inquiry into the “necessity” of a law, Chase’s approach resembles 
the view expressed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in 
United States v. Comstock.209 The Court’s modern Commerce Clause 
precedents, he wrote, “require a tangible link to commerce, not a mere 
conceivable rational relation, as in Lee Optical.”210 For Justice 
Kennedy, “[t]he rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause 
context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstra-
tion. While undoubtedly deferential, this may well be different from 
the rational-basis test as Lee Optical described it.”211 
Like the majority in NFIB, Chase then separately assessed the 
issue of the law’s propriety. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch, he asked whether the means employed, however plainly 
adapted they may be, are “not prohibited, but consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution.”212 He then did a broad survey of 
how the power to compel the acceptance of paper money in 
satisfaction of debts violate the “cardinal principles”213 embodied in 
the Contracts, Takings, and Due Process Clauses—an analysis that is 
too lengthy to summarize here.  
With respect to the Due Process Clause, he offered the following 
analogy: “No one probably could be found to contend that an act 
enforcing the acceptance of fifty or seventy-five acres of land in 
satisfaction of a contract to convey a hundred would not come within 
the prohibition against arbitrary privation of property.”214 Yet he was 
then “unable to perceive any solid distinction between such an act 
and an act compelling all citizens to accept, in satisfaction of all 
contracts for money, half or three-quarters or any other proportion 
less than the whole of the value actually due, according to their 
 
207. Id. at 622. 
208. Id. 
209. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
210. Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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212. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 622. 
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terms.”215 For this reason, he said, it “is difficult to conceive what act 
would take private property without process of law if such an act 
would not.”216  
In this way, Chase adopted what today would be called a 
“substantive” reading of the Due Process Clause, years before the so-
called Lochner Court is said to have invented the concept for political 
reasons. Chase used the Due Process Clause to protect what would 
later be characterized as an “economic” liberty. And he found that a 
law that violates due process is not a proper means of carrying into 
execution the enumerated powers. 
Both because of a lack of sufficient means-end fit, and because it 
violates the letter and spirit of the Constitution, Chase concluded 
that the legal tender law is unconstitutional. Requiring creditors to 
accept paper money as payment for debts “is not a means 
appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any 
express power vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent 
with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the 
Constitution.”217  
Before ending his opinion, however, Chase implicitly acknowl-
edged his own role as Treasury Secretary in promoting the use of 
paper money, including the making of it a legal tender. The “tumult 
of the late civil war” when “apprehensions for the safety of the 
Republic [were] almost universal,” was “not favorable to considerate 
reflection upon the constitutional limits of legislative or executive 
authority. If power was assumed from patriotic motives, the 
assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts.”218 Perhaps 
referring to himself, he wrote, “Some who were strongly averse to 
making government notes a legal tender felt themselves constrained to 
acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the measure.”219 Now “since 
the return of peace, and under the influence of the calmer time,” 
many “who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that 
view, have . . . reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in 
those which we have just announced.”220 
Notwithstanding this explanation, Chase has sometimes been 
criticized for the inconsistency of his stances on legal tender laws as 
the Secretary of the Treasury and as Chief Justice. Yet another 
Justice is not similarly rebuked for a similar switch. In 1952, during 
the height of the Korean conflict, President Truman took control of 
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the Youngstown Sheet and Tubing company facilities by an executive 
order. As Attorney General, Robert Jackson had previously advised 
President Roosevelt that such a seizure would be allowed as an 
exercise of the President’s war power. Yet later as a Justice in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,221 Jackson voted to 
invalidate the seizure by Truman as unconstitutional.  
Like Chase, Jackson obliquely acknowledged his change of heart. 
“That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both 
practical advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress 
anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of 
transition and public anxiety.”222 History has been kinder to Jackson 
than to Chase for his switch in opinion from war-time cabinet 
member to Supreme Court Justice. But, if consistency is a virtue, 
then perhaps we too should be consistent in our praise or 
condemnation of Justices who find decisions they once approved as 
members of the executive branch in time of national emergency to be 
unconstitutional when they are confronted with the same question as 
a Justice in peacetime. 
In any event, Chase’s decision was not to survive. Considerable 
intrigue surrounds the reversal. During the Johnson administration, 
the Republicans in Congress employed the first court-packing scheme, 
reducing the number of Justices to eight, to deny Johnson any 
nominations to the Court.223 The Hepburn case was heard by the full 
complement of eight Justices, and the initial vote in conference on 
November 27, 1869, was 4–4. Shortly thereafter, claiming confusion, 
Justice Grier changed his vote to make the count 5–3 in favor of 
declaring legal tender unconstitutional. 
In December, Congress enacted a law restoring the number of 
Justices to nine, giving President Grant an additional vacancy to fill. 
The law also gave full salary to any Justice who had served for ten 
years and was over the age of seventy. Grier met both of these 
qualifications and was in failing health. Upon the urging of his 
colleagues, he resigned effective January 29, 1870. Chase hoped to 
announce the majority decision on January 31 while Grier was still 
sitting, but, perhaps to prevent this, the dissenters asked for more 
time to prepare their dissenting opinion.224 Consequently, by the time 
the decision was announced in February, there were two vacancies on 
the Court, and the vote to invalidate the law was reduced to 4–3,225 a 
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fact the dissenters would exploit when they formed a new majority to 
reverse. 
The very day that Hepburn was announced, President Grant 
appointed William Strong and Joseph Bradley to fill the vacancies 
created, directly and indirectly, by the December statute. Strong had 
upheld the constitutionality of a state legal tender law as a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice,226 and Bradley too had voiced 
his support for that position.227 To the charge that Grant had engaged 
in court packing, Jonathan Lurie replies that “[t]here is no evidence 
that he intentionally sought out nominees in favor of paper money as 
legal tender.”228 Still he acknowledges that “the government moved for 
reconsideration of Chase’s decision only after Grant’s two nominations 
had been confirmed.”229 
Be this as it may, in his motion for rehearing, Grant’s Attorney 
General Rockwood Hoar stressed that the case had hinged on the vote 
of one man, Justice Grier, whose switch in votes created the 5–3 
majority.230 The motion created much consternation among the 
Justices. Justice Miller, a dissenter in Hepburn, wrote his brother-in-
law of the “desperate struggle in the secret conference of the Court,” 
and that “the fight has been bitter.”231 In the end, rather than rehear 
Hepburn, a majority instead decided to revisit the issue in the new 
case of Knox v. Lee.232 The new majority opinion in Knox, which 
reversed Hepburn, stressed the fact that Hepburn had been decided by 
less than the full complement of Justices.233  
It is proper to say that Mr. Justice Grier, who was a member of 
the Court when this cause was decided in conference, [November 
27, 1869] and when this opinion was directed to be read, 
[January 29, 1870] stated his judgment to be that the legal 
tender clause, properly construed, has no application to debts 
contracted prior to its enactment, but that upon the 
construction given to the act by the other judges he concurred 
in the opinion that the clause, so far as it makes United States 
notes a legal tender for such debts, is not warranted by the 
Constitution. 
 
 Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 626. Chase included the dates in brackets in 
footnotes. 
226. See Lurie, supra note 107, at 48. 
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Judicial intrigue aside, what is especially noteworthy about Knox 
is its capacious and deferential approach to Congress’s powers under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. In his opinion for the new majority, 
Justice Strong stressed that the Constitution must have granted to 
the national government the “power of self-preservation.”234 It would 
“be a most unreasonable construction of the Constitution which 
denies to the government created by it, the right to employ freely 
every means, not prohibited, necessary for its preservation, and for 
the fulfilment of its acknowledged duties.”235 Nor need the power 
being claimed “be found specified in the words of the Constitution, 
or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified 
powers.”236 It is enough that its “existence may be deduced fairly 
from more than one of the substantive powers expressly defined, or 
from them all combined.” Indeed, it “is allowable to group together 
any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed 
has been conferred.”237 
Of course, if Congress is the sole judge of necessity, then this 
gives Congress a power limited only by express prohibitions, not by 
the “spirit of the Constitution,” as Marshall had said and Chase had 
stressed. Sure enough, the new majority adopted a highly deferential 
approach to the issue of “necessity.” The choice of means, wrote 
Strong, was “left to the discretion of Congress, subject only to the 
restrictions that they be not prohibited, and be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the enumerated powers given to 
Congress.”238 This deference was also emphasized in Strong’s 
summary of the legal issue confronting the Court: 
Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we 
must be convinced they were not appropriate means, or means 
conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of 
Congress, or of the government, not appropriate in any degree 
(for we are not judges of the degree of appropriateness), or we 
must hold that they were prohibited.239 
Under this deferential standard, Congress apparently has any 
power it deems to be appropriate that is not expressly prohibited to it 
by the Constitution. This means that Congress’s Article I powers are 
essentially plenary so long as they satisfy something like the modern 
rational-basis test. That they may only be trumped by other express 
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prohibitions in the Constitution underscores the proposition that, on 
this reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the enumerated 
powers in Article I, in and of themselves, provide little or no 
constraints on the power of Congress. 
Today, it is considered retrograde to question the consti-
tutionality of legal tender laws. Yet, Chase’s opinion in Hepburn 
shows just how problematic the case for such laws is, provided one 
takes seriously the enumerated powers scheme. Equally problematic is 
the expansionist reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause adopted 
by the Court in Knox combined with its highly deferential stance 
toward Congress to define the scope of its own power.  
But wait, there’s more. One fair reading of Knox is that it limited 
its finding of the unlimited choice of congressional means to emer-
gency situations involving the “self-preservation” of the government 
itself. After all, both Hepburn and Knox involved the implementation 
of legal tender laws in wartime. In 1884, however, the Court in 
Juilliard v. Greenman240 held that legal tender laws were also 
constitutional in peacetime. “[W]hether at any particular time, in war 
or in peace, the exigency is such . . . that it is, as matter of fact, wise 
and expedient to resort to this means,” wrote Justice Gray, “is a 
political question, to be determined by Congress when the question of 
exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to be afterwards passed 
upon by the courts.”241 Yet, it would only be a few years later that 
the Court managed to march back up the slippery slope. 
If Dewitt shows that the judicial policing of the enumerated 
powers scheme long predates the so-called “Lochner era,” Knox and 
Juilliard show that a highly expansionist reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause adopted by the New Deal Court can be traced back as 
far as the Reconstruction era. Indeed, as mentioned above, it can be 
traced still further back to Justice Story’s reasoning upholding the 
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act in Prigg.242 
Whichever of these stances is correct, it is quite clear that, as Chief 
Justice, Salmon P. Chase was on the side of construing Article I to 
provide judicially enforceable limits on the legislative power of Congress, 
beginning with his enumerated powers objection to the Fugitive Slave 
Act and ending with his same objection to legal tender laws. 
D. Chase on the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens  
of the United States 
As we saw in In re Turner, Chase did not abandon his stance on 
the equality of civil rights that he had advocated for thirty years 
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when he became Chief Justice.243 After his decision in Turner, in 
response to Southern denials of the economic and personal liberties 
of freed blacks, as well as of white Republicans, Republicans in the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. One 
key provision of this amendment was the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, which reads: “No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States,”244 language that was drafted by Ohio Republican Congress-
man John Bingham.245  
In 1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases,246 the Supreme Court 
gutted this Clause by limiting it to only those rights that stem from 
the federal government, such as the protection of life, liberty, and 
property while on the high seas, or the right to access the American 
embassy—as though these were the privileges or immunities that 
Republicans in Congress amended the Constitution to protect. In his 
opinion for the majority, Justice Miller (who had so vehemently 
clashed with Chase in the Legal Tender Cases) claimed that the basic 
economic liberties of property and contract were to be protected solely 
by state governments,247 a conclusion that was hotly contested in 
three dissenting opinions by Justices Bradley, Swain, and Field.  
Slaughter-House is well known to be a five-to-four decision. Yet, 
likely because he wrote no opinion in the case and because the name of 
the Chief Justice was not included in the Supreme Court Reports, it is 
generally overlooked that the fourth dissenter was Salmon P. Chase. 
That same day, the Supreme Court also announced its decision in 
Bradwell v. Illinois,248 a lawsuit in which Myra Bradwell contested the 
state’s refusal to allow her to practice law because she was female. 
Bradwell, forty-three, “had been editing one of the country’s best law 
periodicals, the Chicago Legal News, for some years, meanwhile 
studying law under the tutelage of her husband, a regionally 
prominent attorney and later a judge.”249 She clearly fit the statutory 
requirement specifying “that any adult person of good character and 
having the requisite training, was eligible for admission to the bar.”250 
 
243. See supra Part II.B.  
244. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. 
245. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 166–67 (describing Bingham’s role in the 
drafting of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
246. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
247. Id. at 74–79.  
248. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
249. Hyman, supra note 34, at 163. 
250. Lurie, supra note 107, at 84. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 3·2013  
The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase 
696 
For Justice Miller, Bradwell was an easy case. If the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States did not include the 
economic liberty to pursue a lawful occupation, it protected neither 
butchers nor lawyers. But because Justice Bradley had strongly 
asserted that the Privilege or Immunities Clause did protect this 
liberty, he was obligated either to justify the discrimination against 
women as reasonable, or invalidate the restriction.251 He opted for the 
former. In a now notoriously misogynistic concurring opinion, he 
explained why the legal incapacities of married women, coupled with 
“the paramount destiny and mission” of women “to fulfil the noble 
and benign offices of wife and mother” justified the legislative classifi-
cation.252 In sum, whereas Miller found the Fourteenth Amendment 
inapplicable, Bradley found that the amendment applied, but the 
classification by the state was a reasonable one. In this opinion he was 
joined by Justices Swain and Field, the two Justices who had joined 
Bradley in filing dissenting opinions in Slaughter-House. 
Only the frail and ailing Salmon P. Chase (in the words of the 
reports) “dissented from the judgment of the Court and from all the 
opinions.”253 Chase was too weak and ill from a series of previous 
stokes to write opinions in either case. Three weeks after the decisions 
on Slaughter-House and Bradwell were announced, a final stroke took 
his life.  
Robert Kaczorowski wonders how the outcome of Slaughter-House 
might have been different if Chase had retained some of his early 
vigor. “Would he have been able to persuade one justice to transform 
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the dissenters into the majority?”254 Kaczorowski thinks Chase might 
very well have succeeded.  
Just weeks before the Court announced its decision in Slaughter-
House, Justice William Strong issued an opinion as circuit 
justice for Delaware in which he, and the district court judge, 
Edward Bradford, ruled that the Reconstruction amendments 
affirmatively secured the fundamental rights of citizens. Strong’s 
opinion in this circuit court case would have placed him with 
the dissenters in Slaughter-House. We do not know how and 
why he changed his understanding of the Reconstruction 
amendments. Had a healthy Chase been able to hold him with 
the dissenters, American legal and constitutional history very 
likely would have been very different.255  
Regardless of whether a healthy Chase might have changed the 
outcome of Slaughter-House, most certainly he could not have 
assembled a majority in Bradwell in which he alone “stood on the far 
broader ground of race-free and gender-free access to life’s 
opportunities, benefits, and hazards.”256 Given its beginning in the 
fight to emancipate blacks held in bondage, to its very ending to vote 
to uphold the equal civil rights of women, the long career of Salmon 
P. Chase deserves to be remembered, and remembered fondly. 
III. Why Has Chase’s Career Been Forgotten? 
I hope I have told you enough about the remarkable career of 
Salmon P. Chase to lead you to ask the question: So why don’t we all 
know the story of Salmon P. Chase? The most obvious answer lies in 
the thing for which Chase is most known today, if he is remembered 
at all: his life-long political ambition, which has diminished his 
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memory. In other words, it is not Chase’s deeds that account for his 
neglect, but his alleged deficiencies of character.  
Chase’s later successor as Governor of Ohio and Republican 
President Rutherford Hayes wrote in his diary that Chase “possessed 
noble gifts of intellect” as well as “great culture and commanding 
presence.” But, “[w]hen this is said, about all that is favorable has 
been said. He was cold, selfish, and unscrupulous . . . . Political 
intrigue, love of power, and a selfish and boundless ambition were the 
striking features of his life and character.”257 Rockwood Hoar, who as 
Grant’s Attorney General moved for the reversal of Hepburn, was 
even more critical, calling Chase “insincere, selfish and intriguing.”258 
Justice Miller, with whom Chase contended in the Legal Tender 
Cases, the Slaughter-House Cases, and Bradwell, wrote that Chase’s 
strengths were “warped, perverted and shrivelled by the selfishness 
generated by ambition.”259  
So, truth be told, there was much to dislike about the personality 
of Salmon P. Chase that affected his contemporaries and, through 
them, his memory. But this cannot be a sufficient explanation for 
Chase’s neglect by history. For one thing, ambition is rampant among 
persons in public life who achieve what Chase achieved—even if we 
limit our focus to Chase’s contemporary political rivals. Doris Kern 
Goodwin’s book, Team of Rivals, makes evident the enormous 
political ambitiousness of Chase’s competitors: William Seward, 
Edward Bates, and Abraham Lincoln himself. 
What emerges from Goodwin’s fascinating treatment is that 
Chase was simply not as gifted as the others in concealing his 
ambitiousness in an age when ambition was so frowned upon that 
presidential candidates were not even supposed to campaign on their 
own behalf. In the end, despite his many political accomplishments, 
try as he might, Chase was simply not a very good politician. 
Especially in contrast to Abraham Lincoln, Chase was not, we might 
say, a people person, which even then was extraordinarily important 
both to achieve high office, and to succeed in the offices one achieves. 
Remember as well, that Chase was a former Democrat whose core 
political convictions put him at odds with the more numerous former-
Whigs who formed the Republican Party. In many respects, then, 
Chase had much more intellectually in common with Thomas 
Jefferson’s small government republican party than he did with the 
political successor to Alexander Hamilton’s big government Federalist 
Party. So Chase was condemned to be distrusted and resented by 
 
257. Lurie, supra note 107, at 85. 
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both his Democratic enemies and his Republican friends. Although he 
helped found at least three political parties—the Liberty, Free Soil, 
and Republican parties—in the end, he was truly a man without a 
party in an age of violent partisanship. In a sense, Salmon Chase was 
simply his own man for better, but also for worse. 
This brings me to another of Chase’s character traits that comes 
through his various biographies. Chase, both consciously and 
unconsciously, aspired to be a man of great principle, and he largely 
achieved this aspiration. In very few instances can he be found 
betraying these principles for the purpose of attaining the offices he 
held or the one office that eluded his grasp.260 No, as we have seen in 
various contexts, he always tried to win while championing his 
principles, something we might consider admirable rather than 
deficient.  
Chase was what we today would call a “conviction politician.” 
“He won elections as rewards for his activism and because he 
understood early the need to match existing means with antislavery 
ends.”261 As even his harsh critic Justice Miller conceded, Chase “was 
a great man and a better man than public life generally leaves one.”262 
Or as George Templeton Strong eulogized: “He leaves an honest 
record behind him, though in [public] office nearly all his days.”263 
Strong’s observation that Chase “was an anti-slavery man long ago 
when anti-slavery opinions seemed an absolute bar to all hope of social 
or political advancement”264 is also telling. And what this tells us is 
that, however personally ambitious he was, ultimately Chase put his 
principles ahead of even those powerful ambitions. This must mitigate 
the charge that Chase was all about ambition and nothing more. 
Indeed, it is ironic that, to some extent, Chase’s very public 
proclamation of his principles might well have contributed to his 
negative reputation. For one thing, some reacted to this character 
trait as phony, arrogant, or self-righteous. But, more importantly, 
how does one politically attack a conviction politician who justifies 
what he does on the ground of such great and noble principles as 
liberty and equal rights? One way is to attack his character. Say he 
does what he does, not because of the principles he espouses, but 
because of his naked ambition. That way, we are free to disregard the 
principles along with the man who is advocating them. In short, you 
counter a conviction political figure with an ad hominem argument 
 
260. See Foner, supra note 87, at 75 n.7 (“Chase’s views on the constitutional 
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that undermines his apparent commitment to principle, which is all 
the more effective if there is a basis in fact in his character that even 
his friends would acknowledge. 
Such ad hominem arguments should not be used to conceal the 
career of a man who contributed so importantly to the end of chattel 
slavery. But this very accomplishment may also figure among the 
possible reasons why we don’t remember the story of Salmon P. 
Chase. For that matter, why don’t we know the story of the 
constitutional abolitionists and their role in establishing the 
Republican Party? Why don’t we know the names of the Republicans 
in the Thirty-Ninth Congress who, like John Bingham, wrote and 
approved the Fourteenth Amendment the way we know the names of 
the Founders? Why don’t we know that the Justice Department of 
Republican President Ulysses S. Grant obtained convictions of 
Southern terrorists from Southern juries only to have the Republican-
enacted Civil Rights laws under which they were prosecuted held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court? Why don’t we know that 
Grant’s administration successfully wiped out the Ku Klux Klan 
(until it was revived in the twentieth century)?  
Chase’s political ambitiousness is no answer to these questions, so 
let me offer another. The early twentieth century saw the rise of a 
revisionist Southern historiography that retold the nineteenth-century 
battles for freedom. In this retelling, abolitionists became crazed 
extremists, congressional Republicans became dangerous radicals, and 
Reconstruction became a period of Northern oppression of the South 
and black fecklessness at self-governance. And Ulysses S. Grant 
became one of the worst presidents in American history.  
This narrative certainly fit the need of both the North and South 
for a story that would contribute to national reconciliation. So the 
fight to perpetuate slavery became the great Lost Cause for states’ 
rights. But, not coincidentally, the narrative also fit the needs of the 
defeated and morally discredited Democratic Party—the same 
Democratic Party that, under Woodrow Wilson, would formally 
segregate the federal government.  
It was not until the 1960s and ’70s that revisionist historians—
most notably Eric Foner—began to reexamine antebellum 
abolitionism, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, including the life 
and achievements of one of its founders, Salmon P. Chase.265 But even 
forty years later, their revisionist accounts have yet to permeate the 
popular culture. Despite their efforts, far more Americans know the 
term “carpet-baggers” than know the names John Bingham or Salmon 
P. Chase. 
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Conclusion 
With all this in mind, let me close my account of Salmon P. 
Chase with the assessment of him rendered by his greatest political 
rival, Abraham Lincoln. As we saw, if anyone had a complaint about 
Chase, it was he. Yet, as was his wont, Lincoln adamantly refused to 
let his judgment of Chase’s personality cloud his assessment of 
Chase’s abilities and his principled commitment to the equal 
protection of civil rights. 
On the morning Lincoln intended to reveal his choice of Chase to 
replace Roger Taney as Chief Justice, Lincoln was visited by Chase’s 
supporter John Alley of Massachusetts. When Lincoln informed Alley 
of the news he knew would make his visitor happy, Alley responded, 
  
Mr. President, this is an exhibition of magnanimity and 
patriotism that could hardly be expected of any one. After 
what he has said against your administration, which has 
undoubtedly been reported to you, it was hardly to be expected 
that you would bestow the most important office within your 
gift on such a man.266  
 
(Of course, if this is what your friends say about you, it is clear you 
have a problem.) Lincoln’s succinct response puts the issue of Chase’s 
character in what I think is the precisely right light: “To have done 
otherwise,” he said, “I should have been recreant to my convictions of 
duty to the Republican party and to the country.”267 And, “[a]s to his 
talk about me, I do not mind that. Chase is, on the whole, a pretty 
good fellow and a very able man. His only trouble is that he has ‘the 
White House fever’ a little too bad, but I hope this may cure him and 
that he will be satisfied.”268 As Lincoln told others who criticized his 
choice of Chase, “[n]ow, I know meaner things about Governor Chase 
than any of those men can tell me,” but “we have stood together in 
the time of trial, and I should despise myself if I allowed personal 
differences to affect my judgment of his fitness for the office.”269 
So, when you drive down the street, and you see the name “Chase” 
illuminated every few blocks, think of all that the man being honored 
by those signs accomplished and of how Lincoln characterized him: a 
pretty good fellow and a very able man. Oh, and one of the persons 
most responsible for ending slavery in the United States. Were it not 
for Chase, the Republican Party might not have adopted the 
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constitutional stance it did. It was that stance that provoked the South 
to secede, that led to the Civil War, and that led to slavery’s demise. 
Upon his death, the New York Tribune eulogized: “To Mr. Chase 
more than any other one man belongs the credit of making the anti-
slavery feeling, what it had never been before, a power in politics. It 
had been the sentiment of philanthropists; he made it the inspiration 
of a great political party.”270 Or, as Eric Foner put it, Salmon P. 
Chase “lived to see his political approach to the slavery issue spread 
from a handful of abolitionists to become the rallying-cry of a victori-
ous political party.”271 Each of us should envy that accomplishment. 
All of us should remember it. 
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